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COMMENT, THE SUBSTANTIVE FALLACY OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST AMENDMENT: A CRITIQUE OF OKLAHOMA
TELECASTERS AssOCIATION V CRISP
I. INTRODUCTION
Oklahoma stringently restricts media advertising of alcoholic beverages,
both by statute' and by state constitution. 2 State authority to restrict alco-
hol-related advertisements is based on inherent police power and on the
twenty-first amendment, 3 which delegates to the states power to regulate the
importation and distribution of alcoholic beverages within their borders. 4 In
Oklahoma Telecasters Association v. Crisp , television broadcasters and cable tel-
evision operators challenged Oklahoma's advertising prohibitions, claiming
that the restrictions violated their free speech rights and were inconsistent
with equal protection principles. 6 The Tenth Circuit, reversing the district
court, ruled that Oklahoma could restrict television and cable television ad-
vertisements promoting alcoholic beverages even when Oklahoma's regula-
tions virtually banned television advertising of liquor in Oklahoma.
7
The Tenth Circuit determined that the crucial issue on the merits was
whether Oklahoma's advertising ban violated the plaintiffs' rights to engage
in commercial speech.8 Accordingly, the court decided the case on this issue
and held that Oklahoma's regulations were a permissible infringement of
plaintiffs' commercial speech rights.9 On appeal, the Supreme Court will
review the free speech issue, and will also consider whether Oklahoma's
prohibitions are preempted by federal regulation of cable broadcasting.iO
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 516 (1981) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to advertise any alcoholic
beverages or the sale of same within the State of Oklahoma, except one sign at the
retail outlet bearing the words "Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store," or any combination of
such words or any of them and no letter in any such sign shall be more than four (4)
inches in height or more than three (3) inches in width, and if more than one line is
used the lines shall not be more than one (1) inch apart.
2. OKLA. CONST. art. XXVII, § 5 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or
corporation to advertise the sale of alcoholic beverage within the State of Oklahoma, except one
sign at the retail outlet bearing the words, "Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store."
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
4. The pertinent section of the twenty-first amendment provides: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." Id. § 2.
See also infa notes 170-80 and accompanying text.
5. 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 66 (1983).
6. 699 F.2d at 493. The equal protection claim was based on Oklahoma's inconsistent
treatment of broadcast and print media. Newspapers and magazines published outside of
Oklahoma but circulated within the state were permitted to carry advertisements of alcoholic
beverages while this freedom was denied to telecasters. The trial court did not reach the equal
protection issue, and therefore it was not before the Tenth Circuit on appeal. Id. at 490 n. 1. A
similar equal protection challenge failed in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1981).
7. 699 F.2d at 502.
8. Id. at 498.
9. Id. at 502.
10. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 66 (1983) granting cert. to Oklahoma
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II. OKLAHOMA TELECASTERS AssocIATION V CRISP
A. Background
Pursuant to the Oklahoma Constitution and state statute,"' television
broadcasters in Oklahoma were required to "block out" television advertis-
ing for wine. 12 Failure to comply with this requirement, or the solicitation or
acceptance of advertisements for alcohol, subjected broadcasters to possible
criminal prosecution.' 3  In 1980, the Attorney General of the State of
Oklahoma issued an opinion stating that cable operators were subject to the
prohibitions against alcoholic beverage advertising applicable to television
broadcasters.' 4 The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, the state agency
charged with primary responsibility for enforcing Oklahoma's alcohol con-
trol laws,' 5 then notified cable operators of its intention to enforce compli-
ance with the restrictions on liquor advertisements. '
6
Following the Board's notification, telecasters and cable operators filed
separate suits against Crisp, in his capacity as director of the Board, request-
ing declaratory judgments that Oklahoma's advertising restrictions violated
their constitutionally protected speech rights, and requesting injunctive re-
lief preventing Oklahoma from enforcing its restrictions. 17 In nearly identi-
cal memorandum opinions and orders, the district court granted the
plaintiffs' summary judgment motions and ruled that the power of the states
to regulate liquor pursuant to the twenty-first amendment did not override
the commercial speech rights of the telecasters and cable operators.' 8
B. The District Court Opinion
The district court applied the four-part commercial speech analysis set
forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Publc Service Commission '9 to
Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court granted certiorari
on three questions:
1) May a state adopt, consistently with protection of commercial speech under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, a sweeping ban on truthful, nonmisleading adver-
tising for a lawful product?
2) May a state prevent, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
cable television operators from carrying out-of-state news and entertainment programs
because those programs contain truthful, non-misleading advertising for wine?
3) Is a state's regulation of liquor advertising, as applied to out-of-state broadcast
signals, valid in light of existing federal regulation of cable broadcasting?
52 U.S.L.W. 3230, (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983)(No. 82-1795).
11. See supra notes 1-2.
12. 699 F.2d at 492. Beer advertisements were not prohibited. Under OKLA. STAT. tit. 37,
§ 506(3) (1981), beer containing less than 3.2% alcohol is not subject to the restrictions of
Oklahoma's alcoholic beverage control laws. Because television advertising of beer can refer to
beer containing either more or less than 3.2% alcohol, beer advertising is permitted. See 699
F.2d at 492.
13. 699 F.2d at 492.
14. Id.
15. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 514 (1981).
16. 699 F.2d at 492.
17. Id. at 492-93.
18. Id. at 493.
19. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The four-part analysis for determining the validity of commercial
speech regulation can be summarized as follows. First, the court inquires whether the commer-
cial speech concerns a lawful activity without misleading the public. Second, the court must
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determine the constitutional validity of Oklahoma's laws.20 The district
court concluded that the restrictions did not directly advance the state's as-
serted interest in reducing alcohol consumption, and were more extensive
than necessary to meet the stated interest. 21 Plaintiffs' motions for summary
judgment were therefore granted, and permanent injunctions were entered
prohibiting Crisp and the Board from enforcing the regulations against
either the cablecasters or the telecasters.
22
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Crisp focused on the trial court's appli-
cation of the Central Hudson analysis, and emphasized the significance of the
Supreme Court's recent summary dismissal of the appeal in Queensgate Invest-
ment Co. v. Liquor Control Commission23 for lack of a substantial federal ques-
tion.2 4  In Queensgate, the Ohio Supreme Court had upheld the
constitutionality of Ohio's restrictions on off-premises alcohol advertising in
the face of a free speech attack.25 Crisp argued that the summary dismissal
of Queensgate was dispositive of the issues presented in Oklahoma Telecasters.
2 6
While recognizing that preemption was a potential issue, 2 7 the Tenth
Circuit did not address the preemption question. Rather, it agreed with
Crisp that the precedential effect of Queensgate's summary disposition was the
critical issue on appeal.
28
1. Controlling Effect of the Summary Dismissal of Queensgate
Hicks v. Mranda29 is the leading case on the precedential effect of a sum-
mary dismissal for want of a substantial federal question. Hicks analyzed the
precedential distinctions created by the fundamental differences between the
Court's appellate jurisdiction and its certiorari jurisdiction.
30
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction exists when a state statute is chal-
lenged in state court on the grounds that the statute is incompatible with the
Constitution, and the statute's validity is upheld. 3 1 Unlike certiorari juris-
diction, appellate jurisdiction is mandatory. 32 The Supreme Court is not,
find that the government asserts a substantial state interest. If the answers to the first two
questions are positive, then the court proceeds to consider whether the speech regulation di-
rectly advances the asserted governmental interest, and whether the regulation is more extensive
than necessary to meet the government interest. See id. at 564.
20. 699 F.2d at 493.
21. Id.
22. ld.
23. 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N.E.2d 138, appeal dismzssed, 103 S. Ct. 31 (1982).
24. 699 F.2d at 494.
25. 69 Ohio St. 2d at 366-67, 433 N.E.2d at 142.
26. 699 F.2d at 494.
27. See id. at 492. For a discussion of the preemption issues presented by Oklahoma Telecast-
ers, see inyra notes 148-73 and accompanying text.
28. 699 F.2d at 494.
29. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
30. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976).
32. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344. The decision to assume jurisdiction via a writ of certiorari lies
within the Court's discretion. SUP. CT. R. 17.1.
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however, required to grant plenary review to an appealed case; the Court is
only required to address the merits of the appeal. 33 Consequently, summary
dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal question is a decision
on the merits and leaves the appealed judgment undisturbed.
34
As precedent, summary dismissals are binding on lower courts con-
fronted with the constitutional issues presented in the dismissed appeal.
35
Once an issue has been declared unsubstantial and not deserving of review,
lower courts cannot disregard that pronouncement. 36 As a comment on the
merits, however, the summary dismissal's effect is limited to the precise issues
presented in the jurisdictional statement. 37 Lower courts are therefore pro-
hibited from reaching an opposite conclusion on the precise constitutional
conclusion affirmed by the Supreme Court, but are not bound by the af-
firmed court's reasoning.
38
In considering the effect of Queensgale's summary affirmance, the Tenth
Circuit utilized the methodology set forth in Justice Brennan's concurrence
to Mandel v. Bradley. 39 Justice Brennan outlined two considerations as rele-
vant when determining the controlling effect of a summary dismissal. First,
a court must examine the jurisdictional statement presented by the earlier
case, and ascertain whether the constitutional questions presented in both
cases are the same.40 If both cases present the same constitutional issue, the
court must determine that the prior judgment in fact rested upon decision of
the constitutional questions, and "not even arguably upon some alternative
nonconstitutional ground."
41
The Tenth Circuit found that Oklahoma Telecasters involved substan-
tially the same constitutional issues presented in Queensgale's jurisdictional
statement. 4 2  Under the court's analysis, both cases involved the state's
power, pursuant to the twenty-first amendment, to attempt to limit alcohol-
related problems by prohibiting "some, but not all, forms of liquor advertis-
33. 422 U.S. at 344.
34. Id. Accord Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam).
35. Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176.
36. Id.
37. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344-45.
38. Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176. In clarifying this area of law, the Court stated:
Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question
without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction
and do leave undisturbed the judgment appealed from. They do prevent lower courts
from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily
decided by those actions. . . . Summary actions, however, . . . should not be under-
stood as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions
to the particular facts involved.
Id.
39. 432 U.S. 173 (1977). See 699 F.2d at 496.
40. 432 U.S. at 180 (Brennan, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. 699 F.2d at 496. The jurisdictional statement in Queensgate presented the following
question for Supreme Court appellate review:
Whether Regulation 4301:1-1-44 of the Ohio Liquor Control Commission, which pro-
hibits a duly licensed retail liquor permit holder from advertising the retail price of
alcoholic beverages in any medium visible from outside the permit premises, violates
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States by
suppressing the public dissemination of truthful information about a lawful activity.
699 F.2d at 496-97.
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ing. ' ' 43 The court also determined that the judgment in Queensgate in fact
rested on the constitutional issues presented by the jurisdictional statement,
and was not based on some nonconstitutional ground.44 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that it was therefore bound to follow Queensgate and uphold the
constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising restrictions.
45
2. Interaction Between the Twenty-first Amendment and
Commercial Speech
The decision to follow Queensgate did not terminate the Tenth Circuit's
review. Responding to a Supreme Court admonition not to misunderstand
the effect and use of a summary dismissal, 46 the court of appeals examined
the merits of the broadcasters' challenges.
The crucial question on the merits was whether applying the advertis-
ing prohibitions to the broadcasters violated their constitutional rights of
free speech. 47 Resolution of this question required the court to balance the
plaintiffs' right to engage in commercial speech against Oklahoma's inherent
power, as enhanced by the twenty-first amendment, to regulate advertise-
ments dealing with alcoholic beverages.
48
As a threshold matter, the court held that regulating alcohol-related
commercials was an exercise of the authority granted by the twenty-first
amendment. 49 This conclusion stemmed from recognition that states have
the power, under the twenty-first amendment, to totally prohibit the sale of
alcohol within their borders50 and the power to regulate the circumstances
under which liquor is sold.5 1 Limiting advertisements directly related to the
sale of alcohol was seen as a reasonable way of limiting alcohol abuse and its
associated problems, and was therefore held to be a permissible subject of
state regulation pursuant to the twenty-first amendment.
52 Because the reg-
ulations were enacted pursuant to police power conferred by the twenty-first
amendment, they were entitled to an added presumption of validity.
53
After establishing the nature of Oklahoma's advertising restrictions, the
court considered the interaction between the authority delegated by the
twenty-first amendment and first amendment protections. Conceding that
the broadcasters were engaged in commercial speech entitled to some degree
43. 699 F.2d at 497.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Mandae, 432 U.S. at 177. in Mandel the Court cautioned lower courts not to be so
pre-occupied with a summary dismissal that they failed to recognize independent issues
presented by a case sub judice. Id.
47. 699 F.2d at 498.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 715 (1981) (per
curiam); Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939)).
51. 699 F.2d at 498 (citing New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 715
(1981)).
52. 699 F.2d at 498. But see infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
53. Id. (quoting New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981)).
19841
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of constitutional protection,54 the Tenth Circuit applied the four-part analy-
sis enunciated in Central Hudson.55 Guiding the court's application of the test
was Central Hudson's recognition that commercial speech, although constitu-
tionally protected, is afforded less protection than other forms of speech.
56
Disagreeing with the district court's determination that the advertising
prohibitions did not directly advance the state's interest and were more ex-
tensive than necessary, the Tenth Circuit upheld Oklahoma's restrictions.
5 7
Examining the "direct advancement" strand of the Central Hudson inquiry,
the court held that Oklahoma was not required to prove that its regulations
in fact advanced its asserted interests. 58 Rather, the inquiry was whether the
regulations could reasonably be said to advance the state's interest. 59 Be-
cause it was reasonable to believe that banning alcohol advertising could
effect the state's interest in reducing alcohol consumption, the regulations
directly advanced the state's interest.6°
Turning to the trial court's conclusion that the regulations were more
extensive than necessary to effect the state's goal, the Tenth Circuit noted
that the basis for this conclusion was the fact that the advertising ban pro-
hibited all rebroadcasting of alcohol-related advertisements. 6' Citing the
plurality opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego ,62 the court held that
a total ban on the use of one medium of advertising did not, in and of itself,
render a commercial speech regulation overbroad. 63 Given the availability
of other mediums, for advertising (notably printed publications and on-
premises advertising), Oklahoma's law clearly did not eliminate dissemina-
tion of alcohol-related information. 64 In light of Oklahoma's enhanced po-
lice power under the twenty-first amendment, 6 5 and the forms of advertising
which were permitted, Oklahoma-s restrictions were not more unconstitu-
tionally overextensive. 66 Thus, the restrictions satisfied the constitutional re-
quirements of Central Hudson .67
III. ANALYSIS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDINGS IN OKLAHOMA
TELECASTERS
A. The Tenth Circuit's Reliance on Queensgate was Incorrect
In Oklahoma Telecasters the Tenth Circuit relied directly on the Supreme
54. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
55. 699 F.2d at 499-501. For an exposition of Central Hudson's four-part inquiry, see supra
note 19.
56. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 563. See 699 F.2d at 499, 502.
57. 699 F.2d at 502.




62. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
63. See 699 F.2d at 501.
64. Id. at 502.
65. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
66. 699 F.2d at 502.
67. Id.
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Court's summary dismissal of Queensgate. 6 8 Although the court ultimately
examined the merits of the broadcasters' challenge, its primary holding
found Oklahoma's advertising restrictions valid in light of the Queensgale dis-
missal. 69 As noted above, in order for a summary dismissal to be binding in
a subsequent case the constitutional issues presented by both cases must be
the same.7" In Mandel a. Bradley, 7 1 the Court determined that because the
facts of the case before the court were different than those in a case which
had been summarily dismissed, the summary action was not binding in the
subsequent case. 7 2 Similarly, major factual differences between Queensgate
and Oklahoma Telecasters render Queensgate invalid as controlling precedent
for Oklahoma Telecasters.
The Ohio regulation 73 at issue in Queensgate restricted the freedom of
specified licensees to advertise alcohol prices on their licensed business prem-
ises, 7 4 and also prohibited those licensees from advertising a price advantage
in relation to the alcohol they sold.7 5 Those licensees, along with manufac-
turers and distributors, were still permitted to advertise the retail price of
alcohol in any form of the media, 6 although permit holders were prohibited
from off-premise advertising of the retail price of beer.7 7 Clearly, the regula-
tion of commercial advertising challenged in Queensgate was limited, and, as
a whole, rather permissive. Conversely, the Oklahoma regulations operated
as a virtual ban on advertising concerning alcoholic beverages.7 Beer may
be advertised because of Oklahoma's statutory definition of alcohol, 79 and
magazines and periodicals containing alcohol-related advertisements are al-
68. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
69. See 699 F.2d at 497.
70. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
71. 432 U.S. 173 (1977).
72. Id. at 177. The Court stated: "The precedential significance of the summary action in
[Tucker v. Salera, 424 U.S. 959 (1976)], however, is to be assessed in the light of all the facts in
that case; and it is immediately apparent that those facts are very different from the facts of this
case." 432 U.S. at 177. The factual differences stemmed from the different provisions of the
laws challenged in each case, See id.
73. 5 OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 4301:1-1-44 (1978). This regulation provides in pertinent
part:
No alcoholic beverages shall be advertised in Ohio except in the manner set forth
in 4301:1-03 and as hereinafter provided.
(A) As to advertising on the premises, holders of Class C, D, and G permits shall
not advertise the price per bottle or drink of any alcoholic beverage, or in any manner
refer to price or price advantage except within their premises and in a manner not
visible from the outside of said premises.
(B) Manufacturers and distributors of alcoholic beverages are permitted to ad-
vertise their products in Ohio.
Holders of Class C, D, and G permits shall be authorized to advertise in newspa-
pers of general circulation, radio and television, on bill boards, calendars, in or on
public conveyances and in regularly published magazines. Advertising may include
the retail price of the original container or packages, but such advertising may not in





77. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.211 (Page 1982).
78. See supra notes 2, 12.
79. See supra note 12.
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lowed if the publications are imported into Oklahoma. 80 These are the only
types of liquor advertisements permitted by Oklahoma law.8t Oklahoma's
regulations are obviously very restrictive, almost totally prohibiting alcohol
advertisements, whereas Ohio's regulations prohibit only very limited types
of advertising. 82 Ohio's prohibitions are similar to reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions on speech because they restrict where and how per-
mit holders are allowed to advertise rather than virtually banning this form
of expression.8 3 Thus, the scope of Oklahoma's advertising ban is one fac-
tual difference rendering Queensgate inapposite.
84
The second significant factual difference is that the plaintiffs in Queens-
gaze were liquor permit holders, 85 and as such were subject to rules and regu-
lations issued by the state agency granting their license.8 6 The licensees
therefore exercised their privileges subject to the provisions under which the
license was granted. In Oklahoma Telecasters, the plaintiffs were either televi-
sion broadcasters licensed by the Federal Communications Commission87 or
cable operators operating under local franchises8 8 and subject to federal reg-
ulation.89 Queensgate and Oklahoma Telecasters therefore involve factually dis-
tinguishable regulatory relationships.
A state agency's regulation of its licensees will raise different constitu-
tional issues than an agency's attempt to enforce subject matter restrictions
against independent cable operators and television broadcasters. In Queen-
sgale, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically found that the advertising regula-
tions at issue were properly enacted and within the scope of the Liquor
Control Commission's statutory authority to regulate its licensees.9° The
issue in Queensgale, then, was whether a state agency could regulate its licen-
sees by restricting their commercial speech rights in a limited manner. 9' In-
deed, this is precisely the issue set forth in the jurisdictional statement on
appeal to the Supreme Court.
92
Oklahoma Telecasters, unlike Queensgate, involves a state agency which has
issued regulations governing federal licensees or local franchisees whose oper-
ating privileges were not granted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.
Further, unlike the regulations challenged in Queensgate, the Oklahoma regu-
80. 699 F.2d at 493 n.1.
81. See id. at 492, 493 n.j.
82. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 516 (1981) wit/h 5 OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4301:1-1-44
(1978).
83. Cf Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 650 (1981) (es-
tablishes four-part test for determining whether time, place, and manner restrictions on free
speech will be permitted); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction for use of public streets).
84. Cf Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 177 (1977) (differing statutory schemes were fac-
tual difference precluding existing summary affirmance from constituting controlling
precedent).
85. Queensgale, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 361, 433 N.E.2d at 139.
86. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.03 (Page 1982).
87. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
88. See OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 5.
89. See generally United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
90. Queensgale, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 363-64, 433 N.E.2d at 140.
91. See id. at 366, 433 N.E.2d at 142.
92. See supra note 42.
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lations prohibit any advertising of alcohol by the plaintiffs within the state of
Oklahoma.9 3 Finally, the Oklahoma regulations may be in direct conflict
with federal law and regulations concerning cable television. 94 The two is-
sues presented by the facts of Oklahoma Telecasters are therefore whether
Oklahoma may issue regulations governing federal licensees in direct con-
trast to existing federal regulations, and whether Oklahoma may ban virtu-
ally all alcohol-related advertisements by a particular segment of the media.
The difference in the extensiveness of the Ohio and Oklahoma regulations
and the differing regulatory relationships between the agencies and plaintiffs
in the two cases render the issues presented by Queensgate and Oklahoma Tele-
casters substantially different. Hence, the Tenth Circuit's reliance upon the
summary dismissal of Queensgate was improper.
B. Commercial Speech and the Tweny-first Amendment
1. Oklahoma Telecasters Subordinates Commercial Speech to Twenty-
first Amendment Police Power
This analysis of the Tenth Circuit's application of the Central Hudson test
to Oklahoma's regulations focuses on the Tenth Circuit's conclusions that
the regulations directly advanced the asserted governmental interest and
were no more restrictive than necessary. 95 Oklahoma's asserted interest in
limiting advertising was to reduce the sale and consumption of alcohol and
thereby reduce the accompanying problems associated with alcohol abuse. 96
The Tenth Circuit found this interest to be substantial, and declared it to be
"exceptionally strong" in view of the additional police power delegated by
the twenty-first amendment.97 Because Oklahoma's prohibitions reasonably
related to reducing the sale and consumption of alcohol, 98 the court deter-
mined that, as a matter of law, Oklahoma's laws directly advanced its as-
serted interest.9 9 The court's final inquiry under the Central Hudson analysis
was whether the restrictions were more extensive than necessary to meet the
governmental interests. Even though the prohibitions banned virtually all
alcohol-related commercials by the plaintiffs, the court found that the regu-
lations were not more extensive than necessary. 100 Although the court relied
on the availability of other sources of advertising as one reason for upholding
the regulation,' 0 ' the primary theme of the court's decision was that com-
mercial speech related to alcohol is entitled to minimal constitutional protec-
tion. Central Hudson was characterized as being primarily "a balancing
test.' 1 2 When the power granted by the twenty-first amendment was con-
sidered in conjunction with Oklahoma's inherent police power, the balance
93. See supra note 2.
94. See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text.
95. See 699 F.2d at 501-02.
96. Id. at 500.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 501.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 502. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
102. 699 F.2d at 502.
1984]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
shifted in favor of the state, "permitting regulation of commercial speech
that might not otherwise be permissible."' 1 3 The court believed that this
balance was mandated by the Supreme Court's summary dismissal of Queen-
sgale.10 4 Both conclusions, however, are incorrect.
2. Commercial Speech and the Twenty-first Amendment
Truthful advertisements for the sale of lawful products are a protected
form of speech under the first amendment because freedom of speech neces-
sarily protects the right to receive information and ideas.1 0 5 Although com-
mercial speech comes within the purview of the first amendment, it is given
less protection than other forms of expression.106 In Central Hudson, the
Supreme Court developed an intermediate level of scrutiny for determining
whether regulation of commercial speech passes constitutional muster.
0 7
For a regulation of commercial speech to be valid, the Central Hudson test
requires that it directly advance a substantial governmental interest and not
be more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.108
At the heart of this portion of this comment is the question of whether
the twenty-first amendment's grant of authority to the states to regulate "the
transportation or importation"10 9 of alcohol includes the power to infringe
upon commercial speech rights to a greater degree than if the twenty-first
amendment was not involved. In Oklahoma Telecasters the Tenth Circuit
found that the twenty-first amendment did confer power to regulate com-
mercial speech to a degree which might otherwise be unconstitutional. 10
En banc, the Fifth Circuit has also concluded that restrictions enacted pur-
suant to a state's twenty-first amendment powers invoke a more relaxed stan-
dard of review than is normally applied in commercial speech cases. III
Essentially, both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held that a "rational
basis" standard should be used to review regulations regarding alcohol-re-
lated commercial speech, rather than the intermediate standard set forth in
Central Hudson. '
12
Several Supreme Court cases demonstrate, however, that the twenty-
first amendment does not necessarily enhance the constitutional significance
of a state's interest. Analysis of these cases shows that the twenty-first
amendment's effect must be evaluated by reference to the constitutionally
protected rights threatened by state regulation. In each of the cases, the
Court concluded that it should apply the standard of review customarily
associated with the particular constitutional right threatened by state alco-
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 764-70 (1976).
106. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 4.
110. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
111. Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc),appealfiled, 52
U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Feb. 14, 1984) (No. 83-1221).
112. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 745; Oklahoma Telecasters, 699 F.2d at 501-02.
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hol restrictions. Further, an analysis of the Court's leading cases involving
alcohol-related restrictions of speech contradicts the Tenth Circuit's conclu-
sion that regulations promulgated pursuant to the twenty-first amendment
are entitled to special deference.
3. Oklahoma Telecasters' Subordination of Commercial Speech is Not
Justified by Supreme Court Precedent
In Craig v. Boren 113 the Court struck down an Oklahoma law which
mandated different drinking ages for men and women, declaring the law to
be a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.1 4 Oklahoma argued that pursuant to the twenty-first amendment it
had "enhanced" police power to regulate the drinking age within the state,
and that its statutory scheme was therefore not subject to normal equal pro-
tection strictures.' 15 The Court expressly rejected Oklahoma's argument
that the twenty-first amendment limited the operation of the fourteenth
amendment, and held that invidious discrimination was not saved by virtue
of the state's power to regulate liquor under the twenty-first amendment. 16
Examining the history of liquor regulation culminating in the twenty-first
amendment, the Court concluded that the amendment "primarily created
an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause."1 17
Once passing beyond consideration of the Commerce Clause, the
relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to other constitutional
provisions becomes increasingly doubtful. As one commentator
has remarked: "Neither the text nor the history of the Twenty-first
Amendment suggests that it qualifies individual rights protected by
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment where the sale
or use of liquor is concerned." . . . Any departures from this his-
torical view have been limited and sporadic." 8
The Court went on to apply the standard mandated by the equal pro-
tection clause." 9 Because the Oklahoma law made a gender-based distinc-
tion, strict scrutiny was not applied. Rather, the Court used an intermediate
level of review similar to the standard used in Central Hudson .120
Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau 121 the Supreme Court implicitly
rejected a claim that the power conferred by the twenty-first amendment
limited constitutional due process protections. Constantineau involved a state
statute authorizing public officials to publicly post a notice stating that alco-
hol sales to named persons were prohibited because the state had determined
that those persons were public burdens when they drank alcohol. 122 The
113. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
114. Id. at 210.
115. See id. at 204.
116. Id. at 205, 209.
117. Id. at 206.
118. Id. (quoting P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING, CASES
AND MATERIALS 258 (1975)).
119. See 429 U.S. at 210.
120. See id. at 197.
121. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
122. Id. at 434.
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statute failed to provide notice and opportunity for hearing prior to the pub-
lic posting. 123 The fact that twenty-first amendment powers were involved
did not stop the Court from applying strict due process standards in examin-
ing the statute.'
24
More recently, the Court decided Larkih v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,' 25 which
involved the establishment clause' 26 and a state liquor zoning statute.
127
The statute authorized churches and schools to veto liquor license applica-
tions for places of business within 500 feet of the church or school.' 28 The
Court struck down the statute, declaring that the state may not exercise its
power under the twenty-first amendment in a way that impinges upon the
constitutional protections embodied in the establishment clause. 129 Applica-
tion of the normal standard of review for cases arising under the establish-
ment clause was therefore required.'
30
Finally, Caifornia v. LaRue' 3' and New York State Liquor Authority v. Bel-
lanca 132 do not support the conclusion that the twenty-first amendment lim-
its the constitutional speech rights of non-licensee advertisers. Thus, the
reliance on these cases by the Fifth 33 and Tenth 134 Circuits is misplaced.
In LaRue the Court upheld regulations, promulgated by California's
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, which prohibited nude dancing
and other sexually explicit conduct in establishments holding liquor
licenses.135 Emphasizing that the prohibition applied only to licensed estab-
lishments,' 36 the court found that the regulations were a permissible exercise
of state police power. ' 37 California's regulation was aimed not at an expres-
sion of speech per se, but on conduct associated with the dispensation of
alcohol.' 38 Thus, the regulation was only incidentally a burden on pro-
tected speech.' 39 Clearly, LaRue does not establish that twenty-first amend-
ment police power generally overrides speech rights when alcohol-related
legislation is challenged. At most, LaRue establishes that state power to regu-
late the actual sale of alcohol provides a state with power to regulate speech-
related conduct.
Similarly, in Bellanca the Court concentrated on the fact that the state
123. Id. at 435.
124. See id. at 436-37.
125. 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 provides in part that "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion .. "
127. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 16C (West 1974).
128. Id.
129. 103 S. Ct. at 510 n.5.
130. See id. at 510.
131. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
132. 452 U.S. 714 (1981).
133. See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 744-45 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
134. See Oklahoma Telecasters, 699 F.2d at 499.
135. 409 U.S. at 118.
136. The Court's analysis began by noting that the challenged regulations were presented
"not in the context of censoring a dramatic performance in a theater, but rather in a context of
hcensing bars and nightclubs to sell liquor by the drink." Id. at 114. (emphasis supplied).
137. Id. at 116, 118.
138. See id. at 117-18.
139. See id. at 117.
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regulations applied only to the premises of state liquor authority licensees. 140
The Court's analysis was couched in terms of the state's power to determine
where alcoholic beverages could be sold. 14 ' Given the state's unquestioned
power to regulate the conditions under which alcohol was sold, the state's
interest in public safety outweighed the speech values associated with topless
dancing. 142 Like LaRue, Bellanca only establishes a state's power to regulate
conduct on a licensee's premises.
Summing up the preceding discussion, it seems clear that the Supreme
Court's cases do not support the conclusion that regulation pursuant to the
twenty-first amendment enjoys any special exception from general constitu-
tional principles. Moreover, speech restrictions resulting from twenty-first
amendment regulation have been upheld primarily because the restrictions
applied directly to licensees, and involved only de minimis restrictions on
speech rights. 143 The Oklahoma prohibitions, conversely, are aimed directly
at speech content, and act as a complete ban on alcohol-related advertise-
ments by non-licensee broadcasters not engaged in selling alcohol. Further,
no alternative forums are available for the plaintiffs. 144 The Supreme Court
indicated in Central Hudson that such complete bans on otherwise protected
commercial speech may be presumptively unconstitutional.
We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress com-
mercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy. In
those circumstances, a ban on speech could screen from public view
the underlying governmental policy. . . . Indeed, in recent years
this Court has not approved a blanket ban on commercial speech
unless the expression itself was flawed in some way, either because
it was deceptive or related to unlawful activity.'
4 5
In light of the preceding discussion, the conclusion of the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits that the twenty-first amendment permits a state to enact
otherwise unconstitutional regulations appears unsupportable. Further,
Queensgate does not mandate the conclusion that commercial speech values
are readily subordinated to twenty-first amendment regulation. As noted, a
summary affirmance should not be read to adopt any new ratio
decendendi. 146 LaRue and Bellanca, which are the most directly relevant
Supreme Court decisions, did not contain any general discussion of commer-
cial speech/twenty-first amendment interaction. Rather, those decisions ad-
dress a state's power to regulate its licensees.' 47 Queensgale is properly read as
140. 452 U.S. at 715-17.
141. The Court stated that "[t]he State's power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages en-
tirely includes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on premises where topless dancing
occurs." Id. at 717.
142. Id. at 718.
143. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
144. Given Oklahoma's complete statutory ban on commercial advertising of alcohol, see
supra note 1, this argument takes on additional force if plaintiffs are making a facial challenge to
the statute, because a facial challenge would obviate the mitigating effects of beer and magazine
advertising. The reported opinion does not clearly delineate the posture of the plaintiffs'
challenge.
145. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
146. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
.47. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
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applying the limited holdings of LaRue and Bellanca, rather than as establish-
ing general propositions concerning the interaction of two constitutional
amendments. Hence, there is no basis for concluding that Oklahoma's
"otherwise unconstitutional" restrictions are validated by twenty-first
amendment police power.
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF OKLAHOMA'S ADVERTISING
RESTRICTIONS
The Tenth Circuit recognized that Oklahoma's laws might conflict with
federal regulations, but did not discuss the issue.148 Nonetheless, one of the
issues on appeal to the Supreme Court is whether Oklahoma's restrictions on
advertising by cable operators are preempted by federal law. 149 This section
will analyze the cable operators' preemption challenge.
A. Federal Preemption
The Constitution's supremacy clause 150 provides that the Constitution
and the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."' 5 ' When Congress exercises its granted powers, federal legislation
can supercede, or preempt, state law.' 52 Federal regulations, as well as fed-
eral statutes, have preemptive force.
153
Federal law can preempt state law in three ways. Most obviously, state
law may be expressly preempted, 15 4 or the plan or scheme of federal regula-
tion may evince a congressional intent to preempt a field entirely.' 55 Usu-
ally, however, congressional enactments in a particular area do not expressly
end all state authority. Where state and federal rules coexist, state law is
preempted only when it conflicts with federal law. 156 State law conflicts
with federal law when state regulation "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"'
15 7
or when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce.
'158
148. Oklahoma Telecasters, 699 F.2d at 492.
149. See supra note 10.
150. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. This section provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state




152. See generaly Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983).
153. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
154. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
155. Paific Gas, 103 S. Ct. at 1722; Fidelity Federal, 458 U.S. at 153.
156. Pacifi Gas, 103 S. Ct. at 1722.
157. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
158. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
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B. Conflil Between Federal Law and Oklahoma's Advertistg Restrictions
1. Potential Preemption Through Copyright Laws
The cable operators in Oklahoma Telecasters are governed by both federal
and state laws. Forseeable conflicts between those bodies of law indicate
that Oklahoma's advertising ban may be preempted insofar as it is applica-
ble to cable operators.
Cable television systems are subscription services that pick up broad-
casts originated by others (primary transmissions) and rebroadcast them
(secondary transmissions) to paying subscribers.1 59 Copyright laws protect
copyrights upon secondary transmission by prohibiting cable systems from
making any alteration in a program or a commercial. 160 Any change, dele-
tion, or addition is actionable as an infringement of a copyright. 16 1 These
statutory provisions reflect congressional awareness of the probability that
retransmission of distant non-network programming causes damage to the
copyright owner because the program is distributed in areas in which it has
not been licensed. 16 2 To protect the copyright holder, Congress decided that
secondary transmissions to the public by a cable system ought to be subject
to a compulsory license.' 63 Such a license ensures the copyright owner a fair
share of royalties from the rebroadcast of the copyrighted work, whether it
be a program or a commercial.164 The protection against infringement ac-
tions provided by the license is conditioned upon compliance with specified
procedures, including reporting requirements, 165 payment of the royalty
fee, 166 and compliance with the ban on the substitution or deletion of com-
mercial advertising.'
6 7
Oklahoma's "blocking out" requirement' 68 potentially conflicts with
the compulsory licensing 16 9 program of the federal copyright laws. A cable
159. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161 (1968).
160. 17 U.S.C. § II l(c)(3) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(c) Secondary Transmissions by Cable Systems.
The secondary transmission to the public by a cable system of a primary transmission
made by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission or
by an appropriate governmental authority of Canada or Mexico and embodying a
performance or display of a work is actionable as an act of infringement . . . if the
content of the particular program in which the performance or display is embodied, or
any commercial advertising or station announcements transmitted by the primary trans-
mitter during, or immediately before or after, the transmission of such program, is in
any way wilo4ly altered by the cable system through changes, deletions, or additions, except for
the alteration, deletion, or substitution of commercial advertisements performed by
those engaged in television commercial advertising market research ...
(emphasis supplied).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 88-91 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5702-04.
163. Id. at 89, reprinted tn7 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5703-04.
164. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5703-04.
165. 17 U.S.C. § ll(d)(l)-(2) (1982).
166. 17 U.S.C. § IlI(d)(4) (1982).
167. 17 U.S.C. § Ill(c)(3) (1982).
168. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
169. Cable system operators are required to obtain the rebroadcast license, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 11 l(c)(1) (1982), and are therefore necessarily subject to the ban on deletion contained in 17
U.S.C. § l I I(c)(3) (1982).
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operator's freedom to choose its programming prevents the conclusion that
federal copyright law necessarily precludes application of Oklahoma's adver-
tising restriction to cable systems. Unfortunately for Oklahoma, in certain
circumstances federal regulations require cable systems to carry specified
programming. 170 The copyright laws will, in those circumstances, preempt
the operation of Oklahoma's advertising laws.
2. Potential Preemption Through Federal Regulation of Cable
Systems
Federal regulation of cable systems directly conflicts with Oklahoma's
ban on televised alcohol advertising. Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) regulations require that cable systems carrying required television
broadcast signals 1 7' must carry the signals without deletion or alteration of
any programming, including commercial segments.' 72 Because much of
Oklahoma may be subject to the mandatory signal requirements,
173
Oklahoma's advertising prohibition can directly conflict with federal
regulations.
As a practical matter, it is impossible for most cable operators in
Oklahoma to conform to both the federal and state regulations. Oklahoma's
laws require Oklahoma's cable operators to inspect all of the primary trans-
missions they receive, and "block out" alcohol commercials. Clearly,
Oklahoma's restrictions on alcohol-related advertisements are void to the ex-
tent that they will prohibit cable operators from adhering to federal law.
The applicable provisions of the Copyright Act and the FCC cable regula-
tions which forbid signal alteration by cable operators therefore may pre-
empt the Oklahoma laws prohibiting transmission of alcohol commercials.
V. COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRICTIONS ON OKLAHOMA'S ALCOHOL
ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS
If the cable operators or television broadcasters are engaged in inter-
state commerce they will be afforded the protection of the commerce
clause.' 74 The twenty-first amendment removes the subject of alcohol from
the reach of the commerce clause to the extent necessary to allow states to
control the transportation or importation of alcohol within their borders.'
75
Although this burden on interstate commerce is allowed, interstate busi-
nesses dealing with liquor are entitled to some commerce clause protections;
the twenty-first amendment "does not pro tanto repeal the commerce
170. See tifia note 171.
171. Cable systems can be required to carry signals of broadcasters within specified broad-
cast proximities. 47 C.F.R. § 76.57, -.59, -.61 (1983). Oklahoma's television market is easily
reached by out-of-state broadcasters, potentially making Oklahoma's cablecasters subject to the
FCC's mandatory signal requirements.
172. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(b) (1983).
173. See supra note 171.
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This section provides that "The Congress shall have
Power. . .to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." Id.
175. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976). See generally Annot., 34 L. Ed. 2d 805
(1972).
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clause." 176 Commerce clause implications were not considered by the Tenth
Circuit in deciding Oklahoma Telecasters. The following brief analysis is pro-
vided as further evidence that commercial speech rights cannot be readily
subordinated to twenty-first amendment regulation.
In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. 177 the Supreme Court held
that New York could not regulate liquor destined for foreign ports and
under the control of the Federal Bureau of Customs. 178 Because there was no
showing that the liquor subject to regulation would be diverted into New
York, the state had no twenty-first amendment regulatory power. ' 79 Hostetter
did not read the twenty-first amendment literally; a state's power was lim-
ited to "transportation and importation" of liquor which would affect a
state's population. i80
Several years later the Court affirmed a decision declaring that liquor
involved in foreign commerce was protected by the commerce clause.' 8 '
The lower court had held that where liquor was not being imported for "de-
livery and use" within the state, state regulation could not be predicated on
the twenty-first amendment.'
8 2
In light of the restricted scope of twenty-first amendment police power
recognized by the Supreme Court, where the object of regulation does not
import or transport alcohol for delivery or use within a state, the state's
twenty-first amendment power to interfere with interstate commerce is sig-
nificantly attenuated. 183 Because Oklahoma's advertising ban affects parties
merely broadcasting information about alcohol, it constitutes regulation be-
yond the recognized scope of a state's exclusive power under the twenty-first
amendment.1 84 The regulation must therefore closely conform to commerce
clause principles generally applicable to state laws affecting interstate com-
merce.' 8 5 State regulations may interfere with interstate commerce to a cer-
tain extent, but state prohibitions cannot be oppressive.' 86 In this case,
176. 429 U.S. at 206.
177. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
178. Id. at 333-34.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 333.
181. See Lordi v. Epstein, 389 U.S. 29 (1967) (per curiam), affg, 261 F. Supp. 921 (D.N.J.
1966).
182. 261 F. Supp. at 982.
183. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (state power outside recognized scope of
twenty-first amendment extremely limited).
184. See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
185. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976): ("[T]he Twenty-first Amendment does
not pro lanlo repeal the Commerce Clause, but merely requires that each provision 'be consid-
ered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any
concrete case.' " (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332
(1964)). See also supra notes 113-47 and accompanying text.
186. E.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). In Bibb, the Court struck
down an Illinois statute requiring a certain type of rear fender mudguard on trucks and trailers
operating within the state. While recognizing that states have broad powers to regulate safety
on intrastate highways, the Court held that the Illinois statute placed too heavy a burden on
interstate commerce because Illinois' regulation would subject shippers to other states' contra-
dictory regulations, id. at 527, and would therefore cause significant interference with the free
flow of interstate commerce. Id. at 529-30.
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Oklahoma's restrictions create an unreasonable burden upon interstate cable
operators and television broadcasters.
Oklahoma's regulations affect not only cable operators and television
broadcasters in Oklahoma, but also affect out-of-state operators whose
broadcasts are transmitted into Oklahoma. A television network might
broadcast into several states, but because the broadcast would be transmit-
ted into Oklahoma the company would be required to delete all alcohol
commercials in order to comply with Oklahoma's laws. This would require
out-of-state television companies to preview and alter every broadcast, to
change their advertising policies, or to limit their marketing areas. Simi-
larly, cable operators might find themselves in the same position, although
they service much smaller areas than television broadcasters. A cable com-
pany located outside the state may have subscribers in Oklahoma. If so, the
cable operator, under Oklahoma law, would have to alter its particular
transmissions, change its advertising policies, or limit its available market.
Thus, Oklahoma's regulations are arguably an impermissible burden on in-
terstate commerce.
VI. SUMMARY
The Tenth Circuit's reliance on the summary dismissal of Queensgate was
incorrect. Queensgale involved a state agency narrowly limiting the commer-
cial speech rights of its licensees. 1 8 7 Oklahoma Telecasters involved a state
agency broadly limiting the commercial speech rights of independent ac-
tors.1 88 Because the Tenth Circuit failed to treat Queensgate with the preci-
sion required by Supreme Court decisions, 18 9 it wrongly held that Queensgate
was controlling.
Analysis of the commercial speech question involves a more compli-
cated issue. Oklahoma's interest, when viewed in conjunction with a consti-
tutional amendment directly supporting that interest, may well be
enhanced. Nonetheless, the conclusion that the twenty-first amendment jus-
tifies an otherwise unconstitutional regulation of commercial speech, by cre-
ating a lesser standard for judicial review, is a substantive fallacy. Case law
demonstrates that although the twenty-first amendment may enhance a
state's interest in regulating alcohol-related activities, a court's constitutional
methodology remains unchanged. 190 Thus, Oklahoma's advertising ban
must be evaluated under general commercial speech principles; evaluated
under those principles, the regulations must fall. 191
Further, in light of the federal regulations and laws applicable to cable
operators, Oklahoma's advertising prohibitions may be preempted with re-
spect to cable operators. When Oklahoma's statute directly conflicts with
federal law, 192 it must give way.
187. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 78, 87-88, 93 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 113-42 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 159-73 and accompanying text.
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Finally, commerce clause principles indicate that Oklahoma's laws are
of questionable validity. Oklahoma's prohibitions do not relate to the pro-
cess of bringing alcohol into Oklahoma, but rather seek to regulate speech
about alcohol legally brought into Oklahoma. Oklahoma's advertising pro-
hibition is therefore not entitled to the special deference granted laws within
the clear contemplation of the twenty-first amendment. Instead, the prohi-
bition should be subjected to ordinary commerce clause analysis. Under
such an analysis, Oklahoma's advertising ban must fall as an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce. 193
Leshe C. Hansen
193. See supra notes 175-86 and accompanying text.
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